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T
he market for repurchase agreements
involving Treasury securities (known as
the repo market) plays a central role in
the Federal Reserve’s implementation
of monetary policy. Transactions involv-
ing repurchase agreements (known as
repos and reverses) are used to manage the quan-
tity of reserves in the banking system on a short-
term basis. By undertaking such transactions with
primary dealers, the Fed, through the actions of
the open market desk at the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, can temporarily increase or decrease
bank reserves. 
The focus of this article, however, is not monetary
policy but, rather, the repo market itself, especially
the role the market plays in the financing and hedg-
ing activities of primary dealers. The main goal of the
article is to provide a coherent explanation of the
close relation between the price premium that newly
auctioned Treasury securities command and the
special repo rates on those securities. The next two
paragraphs outline this relationship and introduce
some basic terminology that will be used throughout
the article. (Also see the box for a glossary of terms.)1
Dealers’ hedging activities create a link between
the repo market and the auction cycle for newly
issued (on-the-run) Treasury securities. In particular,
there is a close relation between the liquidity pre-
mium for an on-the-run security and the expected
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spread between the general collateral rate and the
repo rate specific to the on-the-run security). Dealers
sell short on-the-run Treasuries in order to hedge
the interest rate risk in other securities. Having sold
short, the dealers must acquire the securities via
reverse repurchase agreements and deliver them to
the purchasers. Thus, an increase in hedging demand
by dealers translates into an increase in the demand
to acquire the on-the-run security (that is, specific
collateral) in the repo market. 
The supply of specific collateral to the repo market
is not perfectly elastic; consequently, as the demand
for the collateral increases, the repo rate falls to
induce additional supply and equilibrate the market.
The lower repo rate constitutes a rent (in the form of
lower financing costs), which is capitalized into the
value of the on-the-run security. The price of the
on-the-run security increases so that the equilibrium
return is unchanged. The rent can be captured by
reinvesting the borrowed funds at the higher general
collateral repo rate, thereby earning a repo dividend.
When an on-the-run security is first issued, all of the
expected earnings from repo dividends are capital-
ized into the security’s price, producing the liquidity
premium. Over the course of the auction cycle, the
repo dividends are “paid” and the liquidity premium
declines; by the end of the cycle, when the security
goes off-the-run (and the potential for additional repo
dividend earnings is substantially reduced), the pre-
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Announcement date: The date on which the
Treasury announces the particulars of a new secu-
rity to be auctioned. When-issued (that is, for-
ward) trading begins on the announcement date.
Auction date: The date on which a security is auc-
tioned, typically one week after the announcement
date and one week before the settlement date.
Fedwire: The electronic network used to trans-
fer funds and wirable securities such as Treasury
securities.
Forward contract: A contract to deliver some-
thing in the future on the delivery date at a pre-
specified price, the forward price.
Forward premium: The difference between the
expected future spot price and the forward price.
Forward price: The agreed-upon price for deliv-
ery in a forward contract.
General collateral: The broad class of Treasury
securities. 
General collateral rate: The repo rate on gen-
eral collateral.
Haircut: Margin. For example, a 1 percent hair-
cut would allow one to borrow $99 per $100 of a
bond’s price.
Matched book: Paired repo and reverse trades
on the same underlying collateral, perhaps mis-
matched in maturity.
Off the run: A Treasury security that is no longer
on the run (see below).
Old, old-old, etc.: When a security is no longer
on the run, it becomes the old security. When a
security is no longer the old security, it becomes
the old-old security, and so on.
On special: The condition of a repo rate when it
is below the general collateral rate (when R < r).
On the run: The most recently issued Treasury
security of a given original term to maturity—for
example, the on-the-run ten-year Treasury note.
Reopening: A Treasury sale of an existing bond
that increases the amount outstanding.
Repo: A repurchase agreement transaction that
involves using a security as collateral for a loan.
At the inception of the transaction, the dealer
lends the security and borrows funds. When the
transaction matures, the loan is repaid and the
security is returned.
Repo dividend: The repo spread times the value
of the security: δ = ps = p(r – R).
Repo rate: The rate of interest to be paid on a
repo loan, R.
Repo spread: The difference between the gen-
eral collateral rate and the specific collateral rate,
s = r – R, where s ≥ 0.
Repo squeeze: A condition that occurs when the
holder of a substantial position in a bond finances
a portion directly in the repo market and the
remainder with “unfriendly financing” such as in
a triparty repo.
Reverse: A repo from the perspective of the
counterparty; a transaction that involves receiv-
ing a security as collateral for a loan.
Settlement date: The date on which a new secu-
rity is issued (the issue date).
Short squeeze: See repo squeeze.
Specific collateral: Collateral that is specified—
for example, an on-the-run bond instead of some
other bond.
Specific collateral rate: The repo rate on spe-
cific collateral.
Term repo: Any repo transaction with an initial
maturity longer than one business day.
Triparty repo: An arrangement for facilitating
an ongoing repo relationship between a dealer
and a customer, where the third party is a clear-
ing bank that provides useful services.
When-issued trading: Forward trading in a
security that has not yet been issued.
Zero-coupon bond: A bond that makes a single
payment when it matures.
BOX
Glossary1. A number of sources provide additional material for anyone interested in reading more about the repo market. To read about
how the repo market fits into monetary policy, see Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1998 and n.d.). For institutional
details, see Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (1993) and Stigum (1989). For some empirical results, see Cornell and
Shapiro (1989), Jordan and Jordan (1997), Keane (1996), and Krishnamurthy (forthcoming). Duffie (1989) provides some
theory as well as some institutional details and empirical results.
2. There is also an active repo market for other securities that primary dealers make markets in, such as mortgage-backed secu-
rities and agency securities (issued by government-sponsored enterprises such as Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, and the Federal
Home Loan Banks). In the equities markets, what is known as securities borrowing and lending plays a role analogous to the
role played by repo markets, and as such much of the analysis of repo markets presented here is applicable to equities.
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The next section describes what repos and
reverses are, describes the difference between on-
the-run and older securities, and discusses the
ways dealers use repos to finance and hedge. The
article then explains the difference between gen-
eral and specific collateral, defines the repo spread
and dividend, presents a framework for determin-
ing the equilibrium repo spread, and describes the
average pattern of overnight repo spreads over the
auction cycle. 
The central analytical point of the article is that
the rents that can be earned from special repo rates
are capitalized into the price of the underlying bond so
as to keep the equilibrium rate of return unchanged.
The analysis derives an expression for the price pre-
mium in terms of expected future repo spreads and
then computes the premium over the auction cycle
from the average pattern of overnight repo spreads.
Some implications of this analysis are then discussed.
Finally, the article presents an analysis of a repo
squeeze, in which a repo trader with market power
chooses the optimal mix of funding via a triparty repo
and funding directly in the repo market. Two appen-
dixes provide additional analysis on the term struc-
ture of repo spreads and on how repo rates affect the




repurchase agreement, or repo, can be thought
of as a collateralized loan. In this article, the
collateral will be Treasury securities (that is, Treasury
bills, notes, and bonds).2 At the inception of the
agreement, the borrower turns over the collateral to
the lender in exchange for funds. When the loan
matures, the funds are returned to the lender along
with interest at the previously agreed-upon repo
rate, and the collateral is returned to the borrower.
Repo agreements can have any maturity, but most
are for one business day, referred to as overnight.
From the perspective of the owner of the security
and the borrower of funds, the transaction is referred
to as a repo while from the lender’s perspective the
same transaction is referred to as a reverse repo, or
simply a reverse.
For concreteness, the discussion will refer to the
two counterparties as the dealer and the customer
even though a substantial fraction of repo transac-
tions are among dealers themselves or between
dealers and the Fed. Unless otherwise indicated, the
article will adopt the dealer’s perspective in charac-
terizing the transaction. Repo and reverse repo
transactions are illustrated in Chart 1, which can be
summarized by a simple mantra that expresses what
happens to the collateral at inception from the deal-
er’s perspective: “repo out, reverse in.” 
Since dealers are involved with customers on
both sides of transactions, it is natural for dealers
to play a purely intermediary role. Chart 2 depicts a
matched book transaction. In fact, the dealer may
mismatch the maturities of the two transactions, bor-
rowing funds short-term and lending them long-term
(that is, reversing in collateral for a week or a month
from customer 1 and repoing it out overnight first to
customer 2 and then perhaps to another customer).
CHART 1
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example that follows illustrates what is involved in
financing and hedging a position that is generated
in making a market in Treasury securities.
Suppose a dealer purchases from a customer an
old (or older) Treasury security. The dealer may be
able to immediately resell the security at a slightly
higher price, thereby earning a bid-ask spread (see
Chart 3). On the other hand, since older Treasury
securities are less actively traded, the dealer may
have to wait some time before an appropriate pur-
chaser arrives. In the meantime, the dealer must
(1) raise the funds to pay the seller and (2) hedge
the security to reduce, if not eliminate, the risk of
holding the security. The funds can be raised by
repoing out the security. An important way that
dealers hedge such positions is by short selling an
on-the-run Treasury security with a similar matu-
rity. The price of such an on-the-run security will
tend to move up and down with the old security;
consequently, if the price of the old security falls,
generating a loss, the price of the on-the-run secu-
rity will also fall, generating an offsetting gain.
Assuming the dealer does in fact sell the on-the-run
security short, the dealer now has an additional
short position that generates cash (from the buyer)
but requires delivery of the security. The dealer
uses the cash (from the short sale) to acquire the
security as collateral in a reverse repurchase agree-
ment, which is then delivered on the short sale (see
Chart 4).
Typically, customer 1 is seeking financing for a
leveraged position while customer 2 is seeking a
safe short-term investment.
On-the-run securities. The distinction between
on-the-run securities and older securities is impor-
tant. For example, the Treasury typically issues a
new ten-year note every three months. The most
recently issued ten-year Treasury security is
referred to as the on-the-run issue. Once the
Treasury issues another (newer) ten-year note, the
previously issued note is referred to as the old ten-
year note. (And the one issued before that is the
old-old note, etc.) Similar nomenclature applies to
other Treasury securities of a given original maturity,
such as the three-year note and the thirty-year
bond. Importantly, the on-the-run security is typi-
cally more actively traded than the old security in
that both the number of trades per day and the
average size of trades are greater for the on-the-run
security. In this sense, the on-the-run security is
more liquid than the old security.3
Financing and hedging. A dealer must finance,
or fund, every long position and every short position
it maintains. For Treasury securities, this means
repoing out the long positions and reversing in the
short positions. In addition to financing, the dealer
must decide to what extent it will hedge the risk it
is exposed to by those positions. For many posi-
tions, if not most, the dealer will want to hedge
away all or most of its positions’ risk exposure. The
CHART 2






funds + interest funds + interest
A dealer’s matched book transaction involves simultaneous offsetting repo and reverse transactions. From customer 1’s perspective the
transaction is a repo while from customer 2’s perspective the transaction is a reverse. The dealer collects a fee for the intermediation ser-
vice by keeping some of the interest that customer 1 pays.
Customer 1 Customer 2 Dealer
Customer 1 Customer 2 Dealer
CHART 3
Making a Market I
Told Told
bid price ask price
A dealer purchases an old Treasury security (Told) and immediately finds a buyer, earning a bid-ask spread.
Seller Purchaser Dealer3. This greater liquidity is reflected in smaller bid-ask spreads for the on-the-run security.
4. Implicitly, it is assumed that dealers can borrow the full value of a Treasury security. For interdealer transactions, this
assumption is not unrealistic. In other transactions, dealers and/or customers face haircuts, which amount to margin require-
ments. A more accurate accounting of haircuts (larger haircuts for customers than for dealers) would complicate the story
without changing the central results significantly.
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If a purchaser for the original security does not
arrive the next day, the dealer will repo the security
out again and, using the funds obtained from the
repo, reverse in the on-the-run Treasury again (see
Chart 5). When a purchaser arrives, the dealer sells
the original security, uses the funds to unwind the
repo on the old Treasury, and purchases the on-the-
run Treasury outright and delivers it to unwind the
reverse, using the funds to pay for the purchase
(see Chart 6). If all goes well, the dealer earns a bid-
ask spread that compensates for the cost of holding
and hedging the inventory.4
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If no purchaser arrives (the next day), the dealer refinances and rehedges.
CHART 6
Making a Market IV
Outright sale Unwind old repo
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ask price funds
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collateral rate, where R ≤ r.5 The repo spread is
given by s = r – R. If R < r, then the repo spread is
positive and the collateral is on special. Let p denote
the value of the specific collateral.
The repo spread allows the holder of the collateral
to earn a repo dividend.6 Let δ denote the repo divi-
dend, which equals the repo spread times the value of
the bond: δ = (r – R)p = sp. A dealer holding some
collateral on special (that is, for which R < r) can cap-
ture the repo dividend as follows (see Chart 7). The
dealer repos out the specific collateral (borrows p at
rate R) and simultaneously reverses in general collat-
eral of the same value (lends p at rate r). The net
cash flow is zero and the net change in risk is (effec-
tively) zero. Next period the dealer unwinds both
transactions, receiving the specific collateral back in
exchange for paying (1 + R)p and receiving (1 + r)p
in exchange for returning the general collateral. The
dealer’s net cash flow is the repo dividend (r – R)p.
Who would pay a repo dividend? The discus-
sion has just shown how a dealer can obtain a repo
dividend when a security it possesses is on special
in the repo market. But what happens to the dealer’s
counterparty in the repo transaction? The counter-
party (who may be another dealer) has just lent
money at less than the risk-free rate. Why would any-
one do such a thing? In other words, why would
anyone pay a repo dividend?
If the counterparty (the party that is lending the
money and acquiring the collateral) puts extra value
on the specific collateral in question (above and
beyond the value put on similar collateral), then that
party will be willing to pay a fee for the privilege
of obtaining the specific collateral. The dealer can
package the fee as a repo dividend by having the
counterparty accept a lower interest rate on the loan.
In such a case, the specific collateral repo rate will be
below the general collateral repo rate (below the
risk-free rate). But this scenario begs the question,
Why would anyone put extra value on some specific
collateral? Why are other similar bonds not suffi-
ciently close substitutes? The answer is simple:
Anyone who sold that specific collateral short must
deliver that bond and not some other bond. In other
words, traders with short positions are willing to pay
a repo dividend. These traders may well be dealers
who have established short positions to hedge other
securities acquired in the course of making markets.
From their perspective, they are entering into
reverse repos in order to acquire the collateral. By
the same token, investors who do not hold short posi-
tions will be unwilling to pay the repo dividend. They
place no special value on the specific collateral and
accept collateral only at the general collateral rate.
Recall that the hedge is a short position in an
on-the-run Treasury security. In the example, the
hedged asset is another (older, less liquid) Treasury
security. Dealers hedge a variety of fixed-income
securities by taking short positions in on-the-run
Treasuries. For example, dealers hedge mortgage-
backed securities by selling short the on-the-run
ten-year Treasury note. As noted above, on-the-run
Treasuries are more liquid than older Treasuries;
indeed, on-the-run Treasuries are perhaps the most
liquid securities in the world. Liquidity is especially
important for short sellers because of the possibility
of being caught in a short squeeze. In a short squeeze,
it is costly to acquire the collateral for delivery on
the short positions. Because the probability of being
squeezed is high for large short positions, such posi-
tions are not typically established in illiquid securi-
ties; consequently, squeezes are rarely seen in illiquid
securities, which is to say the unconditional prob-
ability is low. The equilibrium result is that squeezes
arise most often in very liquid securities (uncondi-
tionally), because the (conditional) probability of
being squeezed is low. 
Repo Rates and the Repo Dividend
A
s noted above, repurchase agreement transac-
tions can be thought of as collateralized loans.
The loan is said to finance the collateral. For most
publicly traded U.S. Treasury securities the financ-
ing rate in the repo market is the general collateral
rate (which can be thought of as the risk-free interest
rate). In contrast, for some Treasury securities—
typically recently issued securities—the financing
rate is lower than the general collateral rate. These
securities are said to be on special, and their financ-
ing rates are referred to as specific collateral rates,
also known as special repo rates. The difference
between the general collateral rate and the specific
collateral rate is the repo spread. 
Let r denote the current one-period general col-
lateral rate (also referred to as the risk-free rate),
and let R denote the current one-period specific
Dealers’ hedging activities create a link
between the repo market and the auction
cycle for newly issued (on-the-run) 
Treasury securities.5. For institutional reasons, R ≥ 0 as well.
6. Unlike most of the technical terms in this article, the term repo dividend is not standard.
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What determines the repo spread? One can
adopt a simple model of supply and demand to ana-
lyze how the repo spread is determined. Chart 8
shows the demand for collateral by the shorts
(those who want to do reverses) and the supply of
collateral by the longs (those who want to do repos).
The horizontal axis measures the amount of trans-
actions, and the vertical axis measures the repo
spread. The equilibrium repo spread and amount of
transactions are determined by where supply and
demand intersect. In the chart, the security is on
special since the repo spread is positive. If instead
the demand curve hit the horizontal axis to the left
of Q0, then the repo spread would be zero and the
security would be trading at general collateral in the
repo market.
Up to Q0, the supply curve is perfectly elastic at
a zero spread (R = r). There is a group of holders
(those who hold the collateral) who will lend their
collateral to the repo market at any spread greater
than or equal to zero. Beyond Q0, the supply curve
slopes upward. To attract additional collateral, the
marginal holders require larger and larger spreads.
But why is the supply curve not infinitely elastic at
all quantities? The fact that the supply curve rises
at all indicates that some holders forgo repo spreads
of smaller magnitudes. In fact, there are some hold-
ers who do not offer their collateral at any spread.
At least for smaller spreads, transactions costs of
various sorts can account for the upward slope. In
addition, some holders are restricted legally or
institutionally from lending their collateral.
There is an important aspect of the repo market
that is not explicitly modeled here: The amount of
short interest may exceed the total quantity of the
security issued by the Treasury. For example, there
may be short positions totaling $20 billion in a given
security even though the Treasury has issued only
$5 billion of that security. In this situation, a given
piece of collateral is used to satisfy more than one
short position; this scenario demonstrates the velocity
of collateral. In effect, the market expands to match
the supply, at least to some extent. However, main-
taining this velocity involves informational and
technological costs. As the amount of short interest
increases and more collateral needs to be reversed
in, identifying holders who are willing to lend col-
lateral becomes more difficult. Some who held col-
lateral earlier in the day may no longer have it; others
who did not have it earlier may be holders now.
Overall, several features may contribute to the
upward slope of the supply curve.
The auction cycle. The supply and demand
framework can be used to illustrate the average pat-
tern of overnight repo spreads over the course of the
CHART 7
Capturing the Repo Dividend
gen. collat. spec. collat.
At inception:
funds funds
gen. collat. spec. collat.
At maturity:
(1 + r) × funds (1 + R) × funds
A dealer can capture the repo dividend by repoing out the specific collateral that is on special and simultaneously reversing in general col-
lateral. The dealer nets (r – R) times the value of the specific collateral financed in the repo market.
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An Equilibrium Repo Spread
The supply of repos and the demand for reverse repos determine
the repo spread, r – R. If the demand intersects the horizontal
axis to the left of Q0, then the repo spread will be zero.34 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2002
overnight spread descending to (and presumably
staying at) zero in week 13. This diagram is an
adequate approximation for the three-year note
but it is not a good approximation for the ten-year
note, for which the overnight repo spread can
average 25 to 50 basis points during the following
auction cycle. In the next section, the analysis will
demonstrate how the expected future overnight
repo spreads are reflected in the price of the on-
the-run bond.
Repo Dividends and the Price of the 
Underlying Bond
A
simple rule can be used to determine what the
expected payment of a repo dividend does to the
price of a bond: The expected return on the bond
(which includes the repo dividend) is unchanged. The
expected return is simply repackaged; whatever goes
into the repo dividend yield comes out of the capital
gain. In other words, the spot price will rise until the
expected return on the bond is exactly the risk-free
rate, r, as the following analysis demonstrates. 
Let  p denote the current price of an n-period
default-free zero-coupon bond, and let p′ denote the
price of that bond next period when it becomes an
(n – 1)-period bond. Recall that r is the one-period
risk-free interest rate (which is the same as the gen-
eral collateral rate). In this case (assuming there is
no uncertainty for the time being), the current price
equals the present value of next period’s price:
auction cycle. For example, the U.S. Treasury typi-
cally auctions a new ten-year Treasury note every
three months (at the midquarter refunding in
February, May, August, and November).7 There are
three important periodic dates in the auction cycle:
the announcement date, the auction date, and the
settlement (or issuance) date. On the announcement
date, the Treasury announces the particulars of the
upcoming auction—in particular, the amount to be
auctioned—and  when-issued trading begins.8 The
auction is held on the auction date and the security
is issued on the settlement date. There is usually
about one week from the announcement to the auc-
tion and one week from the auction to the issuance.
During a typical (stylized) auction cycle, the
supply of collateral available to the repo market is at
its highest level when the security is issued in the
sense that Q0 ≥ Q, so that the overnight repo spread
is zero. As time passes, more and more of the secu-
rity is purchased by holders who do not lend their
collateral to the repo market. Consequently, Q0
declines over time, shifting the supply curve to the
left and driving the repo spread up (see Chart 9).
When forward trading in the next security begins on
the announcement date, the holders of short posi-
tions roll out of the outstanding issue; the demand
curve shifts rapidly to the left and drives the repo
spread down.
Chart 10 shows how the shifts in supply and
demand described above are reflected in the aver-
age pattern of overnight repo spreads for an on-
the-run security with a three-month auction cycle.
Actual auction cycles display a huge variance








The Effect of a Decrease in the 
Repo Supply Curve
A decrease in the supply of collateral leads to an increase in the
repo spread from r – R to r – R′ or, equivalently, a fall in the
special repo rate from R to R′.































The Average Pattern of Overnight Repo Spreads
The chart shows the average pattern of overnight repo spreads
for an on-the-run security with a three-month (thirteen-week) auc-
tion cycle. The current on-the-run security is issued at week 0. The
next security is announced at week 11 (at which point forward
trading in the next security begins), auctioned at week 12, and
issued at week 13. The overnight repo spreads reach a peak of
200 basis points per day at week 11. This cycle produces 0.5 ×
91 × 200 = 9,100 basis-point days of repo dividend earnings (the
total area under the curve).7. Occasionally, instead of issuing a new security the Treasury reopens the existing on-the-run security, selling more of the
same security at the next auction. See the discussion on reopenings below.
8. When-issued trading refers to forward transactions for delivery of the next issue when it is issued.
9. A short forward position is established by selling the bond short for p and financing it in the repo market (on a reverse repur-
chase agreement) for one period at rate R. Next period, one receives (1 + R)p and delivers the bond.
10. The forward price does not depend on the price of a one-period bond as is sometimes incorrectly assumed. See Appendix 2
for a discussion of how this miscalculation of the forward price can lead to a false rejection of the expectations hypothesis.
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(1)
For a one-period bond, p′= 1 and p = 1/(1 + r). If
the bond paid a dividend, δ, at the end of the period,
then the current price would reflect the present
value of that dividend as well:
(2)
If the dividend is in fact a repo dividend, where δ =
(r – R)p, then
(3)
Because both sides of equation (3) involve the cur-
rent price, p, the equation can be solved as follows:
(4)
Note the similarity of equation (4) to equation (1).
The value of a bond that pays a repo dividend equals
next period’s price discounted at its own repo rate.
Equation (4) reduces to equation (1) when R = r.
Rearranging equation (2) produces
(5)
where the first term on the left-hand side of equa-
tion (5) is the capital gain and the second term is
the (repo) dividend yield (δ/p = r – R). Neither the
risk-free rate, r, nor next period’s bond price, p′,
depends on the current repo dividend, δ, or the cur-
rent repo rate, R. Comparing two securities with
different repo rates reveals that, for the bond with
the lower repo rate, (1) the repo dividend is higher,
(2) the dividend yield is higher, (3) the current
bond price is higher, (4) the capital gain is smaller,
and (5) the expected return is the same.
Uncertainty and the forward premium. When
uncertainty is introduced, risk premiums must be
accounted for. Risk premiums compensate investors
for bearing risk by increasing the expected return.
Because repo transactions are essentially forward
contracts, it is convenient to introduce risk premiums








































A forward contract is an agreement today to
deliver something on a fixed date in the future
(the delivery date) in exchange for a fixed price
(the forward price). A repo establishes a forward
position, and the repo rate on a bond is simply a
way of quoting the forward price of the bond. An
n-period default-free zero-coupon bond with a
face value equal to 1, by definition, pays its owner
1 after n periods. Let p denote the current (spot)
price of this bond, F denote the forward price of
the bond for delivery next period, and R denote
the (one-period) repo rate for the bond. A long
forward position is established by buying the bond
for p and financing it in the repo market for one
period at rate R. (The net cash flow at purchase is
zero.) In the next period, one pays (1 + R)p and
receives the bond.9 Therefore, the forward price is
F = (1 + R)p.10 In fact, the repo rate is defined by
R = F/p – 1.
If current information is available, one knows
the current bond price, p; the current repo rate, R;
and the current risk-free rate, r. But one does not
know for sure the price of the bond next period, p′
(unless it is a one-period bond, in which case p′ =
1). Assuming that one knows the probability distri-
bution of p′, then one knows the average price
(also known as the expected  price). Let E[p′]
denote the expected price. The actual price of the
bond next period, p′, equals its expected price plus
a forecast error ε that is independent of everything
currently known:
(6) p′ = E[p′] + ε.
The forward price, F, is also known today. The
forward premium, p, is defined as the difference
between the expected and the forward price:
(7) π = E[p′] – F.
The forward premium is a risk premium. Given p =
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where the indexes in the sums begin at one instead of
zero. Subtracting equation (13b) from (13a) yields, 
(14)
In equation (14), the uncertainty is decomposed
into two components: uncertainty associated with
future repo spreads and uncertainty associated with
future interest rates. If a dealer is using the bond to
hedge another position, then the effect of unantici-
pated changes in future interest rates on the bond’s
price is offset by the hedged position (by assumption).
However, the effect of unanticipated changes in future
repo spreads is not offset. The dealer faces this very
real risk when using short positions in on-the-run
securities to hedge other securities. If expected future
repo spreads fall while the dealer’s short position is
open, the dealer may be forced to repurchase the
bond at a significantly higher price when the hedge
is removed, leading to possibly substantial losses.
The price premium and future repo spreads.
The analysis next compares the price of an n-period
bond that may earn repo dividends (specific collat-
eral) with the price of a baseline n-period bond that
earns no repo dividends.13 To simplify the exposi-
tion, it is assumed there is no uncertainty.
Let the price of the specific collateral be p and
the price of the baseline bond be p –. The price pre-
mium of the specific collateral over the baseline
bond can be measured as ψ = log(p/p –). The price of
the baseline bond can be expressed in terms of the
current and future one-period risk-free interest
rates (general collateral rates) (compare equation
[11]): p – = Π
n–1
i=0/(1 + r(i)), where r(0) = r, r(1), r(2) =
r′′, and so on. Then the price premium is given by 
(15)
The relative price premium equals (to a close
approximation) the sum of the current and future
repo spreads. A bond may have a significant price
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Using R = r – δ/p to eliminate R,11 equation (8) can
be reexpressed as
(9)
which demonstrates that the expected return (cap-
ital gains plus repo dividends, both as fractions of
the investment) equals the risk-free rate plus a risk
premium. Equation (9) reduces to equation (5)
when there is no uncertainty. The comparison fol-
lowing equation (5) between two bonds with dif-
ferent repo rates applies just as well when there
is uncertainty.
Future repo rates. In order to express equa-
tion (4) in terms of future repo rates, one can
assume for the moment there is no uncertainty.
Recall that p is the price of an n-period zero-
coupon bond. For a one-period bond, p′ = 1, and
equation (4) implies that p = 1/(1 + R). For a bond
with a maturity of two periods or more, let p′′
denote its price two periods hence when it
becomes an (n – 2)-period bond. Similarly, let r′
and R′ denote the values next period of the short-
term interest rate and the repo rate. Then, follow-
ing the same steps that led to equation (4), 
(10)
Using equation (10) to eliminate p′ from equation
(4) yields p = p′′/(1 + R)(1 + R′). For a two-period
bond, p′′ = 1 and p = 1/(1 + R)(1 + R′). An analo-
gous expression holds for bonds of longer maturi-
ties. If p is the price of an n-period bond, then 
(11)
where R(0) = R, R(1) = R′, R(2) = R′′, etc. Equation
(11) expresses the bond price as the present value
of the final payment discounted at its current and
future one-period repo rates.12 As an approxima-
tion, equation (11) can be written as
(12)
where the repo rates are expressed in terms of the
risk-free (general collateral) rate and the repo spread,
R(i) = r(i) – s(i). Equation (12) shows that higher repo
spreads lead to higher bond prices while higher risk-
free rates lead to lower bond prices.
If uncertainty is introduced into future risk-free
rates and repo spreads (the current risk-free rate, r,
and repo spread, s, are known, of course) and if, for
expositional simplicity, all uncertainty is assumed to


































































δπ11. Recall that δ = (r – R)p.
12. Consequently, the yield to maturity on a bond is (approximately) the average of these repo rates: –log(p)/n= Σ
n–1




13. There are a sufficient number of securities that can reasonably be assumed to satisfy this condition so that the value of a
baseline bond can be calculated for any specific security.
14. The repo spreads in Chart 10 are quoted in basis points per day, which must be converted to basis points per year before
they can be plugged into Equation (15). The total area under the curve in Chart 10 is 
1/2 × 91 × 200 = 9,100 basis-point days,
which equals approximately 25 basis-point years.
15. In addition, owing to institutional details, the repo spread cannot exceed the general collateral rate, so it is possible to have
larger repo spreads when short-term rates are higher.
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premium, even though it has no current repo divi-
dends, as long as it has future repo dividends. This
pattern can be seen in the Treasury market. When
a bond is first issued, typically it has a significant
price premium even though it is not on special for
overnight repo transactions. Later, however, the
overnight rates typically move lower than the general
collateral rates, opening up a significant repo spread.
Given equation (15), the price premium can be
expressed as ψ≈s + ψ′, where ψ′ = Σ
n–1
i=1s(i) is the
price premium next period. This relation between ψ
and ψ′ shows that the price premium declines over
time as the repo dividends are paid: ψ′ – ψ≈–s. The
larger the repo spread, the greater the decline in the
price premium; conversely, if the current repo spread
is zero, then the price premium does not decline.
The presence of uncertainty complicates the sit-
uation slightly. If there is uncertainty about future
repo spreads, then revisions in their expectations will
also affect the change in the price premium. In this
case, it is the expected change in the price premium
that is approximately equal to (the negative of) the
current one-period repo spread: E[ψ′] – ψ≈–s.
Chart 11 shows the price premium, π, computed
from the repo spreads shown in Chart 10. Equation
(15) provides the link between the two graphs. The
height of the curve in Chart 11 for a given week
equals the sum of the remaining repo spreads, which
in turn equals the area under the curve in Chart 10 to
the right of that week. Thus, the premium of 25 basis
points at week 0 in Chart 10 equals the total area
under the curve.14 The premium of 25 basis points is
in line with that for the thirty-year bond during the
late 1980s and early 1990s. During the same period
the average price premium at issuance for the ten-
year note was about 60 basis points while it was about
10 basis points for the three-year note. These average
price premia all display the same general shape as
that displayed in Chart 11. The one significant differ-
ence is that the ten-year note retained a 20 basis
point premium throughout the following cycle. The
huge variance around the average pattern shown in
Chart 11 is consistent with the variance around the
pattern of overnight repo rates shown in Chart 10.
Implications and Discussion
F
actors that determine the total specialness.
One implication of the analysis is that the size of
the price premium at the auction depends on the
total number of basis-point days of “specialness”
that the security will generate during its life. The
security’s total specialness can increase either
through the overnight spread increasing or by the
security being on special for a longer time. For
example, the main reason the price premium for the
two-year note is small on average (less than 10 basis
points) is that it is on a monthly cycle and therefore
has only about thirty days to accumulate repo divi-
dends versus the ninety-one days for securities with
a three-month cycle. As noted above, securities that
are on quarterly cycles typically have larger price
premiums; the significant variation across the price
premiums of such securities can be attributed to
the average size of the spreads.15
Occasionally, instead of selling a new security at
the next auction, the Treasury reopens the existing
on-the-run security. Such a reopening extends the
length of time the security is on the run. Since the




















The Average Price Premium
The chart shows the average price premium for an on-the-run
security with a three-month (thirteen-week) auction cycle. This
price premium is computed from the stylized overnight repo
spreads in Chart 10. The price premium is the sum of all remain-
ing repo spreads. When the security is issued, it has a price pre-
mium of about 25 basis points of the value of a reference bond.
(The bid-ask spread for an on-the-run security is less than or equal
to 1/32 per 100 = 3.125 basis points.)38 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2002
Not all reopenings increase the length of time a
security remains on the run. In the wake of the dis-
aster in New York City on September 11, 2001, the
Treasury conducted a surprise reopening of the ten-
year note in the middle of the auction cycle. This
reopening had the desired effect of increasing the
supply available to the repo market and raising
overnight repo rates significantly. The reopening
apparently also had a salutory effect on other issues
as market participants recognized the Treasury’s will-
ingness to undertake such reopenings as it saw fit.
Convergence trades. The price premium that
the on-the-run bond commands typically disappears
by the time it goes off the run; that is, the on-the-
run security displays a predictable capital loss rel-
ative to the baseline security (which for practical
purposes can be taken to be the old security). In
other words, the price of the on-the-run security
converges to the price of the baseline bond. The
popular press has described a convergence trade
that purports to profit from this price convergence.
But, as discussed earlier, the systematic movement
in relative prices is offset by the relative financing
costs. Although individual episodes may have pro-
duced substantial profits for convergence trades,
other episodes have produced substantial losses.
On average such trades are not profitable.
If uninformed speculators came to dominate the
short interest in the on-the-run security in a mistaken
attempt to profit from convergence, such specula-
tors would change the dynamics of the auction cycle.
Convergence occurs precisely because the shorts
(who ordinarily are hedgers) roll out of the current
on-the-run security and into the next issue, thereby
eliminating the possibility of substantial future repo
dividends for the current issue. By contrast, conver-
gence traders (who are also short) will wait until the
liquidity premium disappears before they close their
short positions. But if convergence traders constitute
a sufficient amount of short interest, then their short
positions—by themselves—will keep the liquidity
premium from disappearing. At this point, other
speculators who simply observed the price premium
without considering the repo market might conclude
that a special profit opportunity had appeared and
jump into the convergence trade, further increasing
the repo spread and price premium. Those who
jumped in early would find the premium has
diverged instead of converged.
The Repo Squeeze
T
he analysis thus far has assumed that the repo
spread is determined in a market in which no
agent has (or exercises) market power. By contrast,
supply available to the repo market is replenished by
the new issuance, overnight repo rates tend to follow
the same pattern on average for a reopened issue.
Nevertheless, if such a reopening can be forecast
ahead of time, all of the repo dividends from the next
auction cycle will be capitalized into the value of the
current on-the-run security, raising the premium.
A number of factors that affect the total special-
ness came together to produce a spectacularly large
price premium for one issue. In the early 1990s, the
Treasury changed the auction cycle for the thirty-
year bond from quarterly to semiannually. This
change effectively doubled the number of days that
the new thirty-year would maintain its on-the-run
status. Therefore, it was reasonable to forecast that
the total amount of specialness that would accrue
to the bond had increased significantly, and capital-
izing those increased dividends led to a price pre-
mium that was substantially larger than usual. 
Once the price premium reached a certain critical
amount, another factor entered the picture. Just
prior to the change in the auction cycle, the Treasury
had committed to reopening any security for which
there appeared to be a significant “shortage.” A sig-
nificant price premium was considered to be one
symptom of a shortage. When the Treasury changed
the auction cycle, there had not yet been an oppor-
tunity to demonstrate a willingness to follow through
on the stated commitment, and it was widely
believed that the Treasury would do so at the first
opportunity. With the price premium on the thirty-
year bond reaching new heights, it was reasonable to
forecast that the Treasury would reopen the bond at
the next auction (six months hence) with the result
that the bond would remain on the run for a whole
year. Given this belief, it was reasonable to forecast
the amount of specialness that would accrue to the
thirty-year had increased significantly yet again. As a
consequence, the price premium increased even
more, tending to confirm the belief that the Treasury
would reopen the bond, and such a reopening is of
course just what occurred. 
An increase in expected future short selling
drives up the current price of a Treasury
bond because future repo dividends are 
capitalized while the expected return on 
the security is unchanged.16. The dealer’s counterparty on a triparty agreement has no interest in whether any of the collateral in its triparty repo account
at its clearing bank is on special, and it will not accept less than the general collateral rate on its loans to the dealer secured
by that collateral.
17. The trader plays the role of the dominant firm among a competitive fringe of other suppliers.
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an agent with a sizable position to finance faces an
interesting problem—how to finance at the cheapest
possible rate given that the amount financed may
affect the rate paid. In order to understand the trade-
offs a repo trader faces in choosing the optimal mix,
it is necessary to be familiar with a triparty repo.
Triparty repo. To obtain reliable sources of
funding, dealers quite commonly establish ongoing
relationships with customers seeking safe short-
term investments for their funds such as repos. To
facilitate this relationship, the dealer and the cus-
tomer may enter into a triparty repo agreement in
which the third party is a clearing bank. Both the
dealer and the customer must have clearing
accounts with the bank. The bank provides a num-
ber of services, including verifying that the collat-
eral posted by the dealer meets the prespecified
requirements of the customer. An important aspect
of a triparty repo is that the transfer of collateral
and funds between the dealer and the customer
occurs entirely within the books of the clearing
bank and does not require access to Fedwire. This
feature is convenient because it allows for repo
transactions to be consummated late in the day
after Fedwire is closed for securities transfers,
which typically is midafternoon.
The repo squeeze. Suppose a repo trader has a
sizable (long) position in a Treasury security to
finance. The position may have been acquired out-
right by the dealer’s Treasury desk or it may have
been acquired by the repo trader himself via
reverse repos for some term to maturity. The collat-
eral can be financed either directly in the market at
rate R or via a triparty repo at the general collateral
rate, r.16 What makes this choice interesting is that
the amount the trader finances directly in the market
may affect the repo rate itself. If the trader’s position
is substantial, then as more and more collateral is
lent directly in the repo market, the special repo
rate will rise. In this case, the traders must take
care to compute the financing mix that minimizes
the total financing cost.
Let Q denote the total amount of collateral to be
financed and q denote the amount financed directly
in the market so that Q – q is the amount financed
via a triparty repo. Therefore, the cost of financing
the collateral is Rq + r(Q – q). This financing cost
can be rewritten as rQ – (r – R)q, which expresses
the financing cost as the general collateral rate
applied to the total amount of collateral, rQ, less the
repo dividend on the amount financed directly in
the market, (r – R)q. Thus, minimizing the finance
cost is the same as maximizing the repo dividend.
The problem for a trader with a large position is that
an increase in q leads to an increase in R, decreas-
ing the spread, r – R. Whether the repo dividend
goes up or down when q increases depends on just
how responsive the special repo rate is to the
amount of collateral lent directly to the market.
In effect, the trader has the same problem as a
monopolist: The amount “produced” (q) affects the
price (r – R). The trader faces a downward-sloping
demand curve. In this case, the demand curve fac-
ing the trader is a net demand curve, in which the
supply of collateral by others is subtracted from the
demand for collateral by the holders of short posi-
tions.17 This situation is depicted in Chart 12. The
quantity that maximizes the repo dividend (q*) is
determined by the condition that marginal revenue
be zero. If Q ≤ q*, then all the collateral is financed
directly in the market. On the other hand, if Q > q*,
then q* is financed directly in the market and Q – q*
is financed via a triparty repo at the higher rate, r.
This situation (that is, when Q > q*) is known as
a repo squeeze. There are two essential ingredients
for a repo squeeze. First, there must be outstanding
short positions; otherwise, the security could not go
on special. Second, the trader must have possession











Maximizing the Repo Dividend
In the left panel, the demand curve for collateral by the shorts is
labeled  D, and the supply curve of collateral by others is
labeled S. In the right panel, the difference between D and S is
the net demand facing the trader, and the diagonal dashed line is
marginal revenue. The arrow indicates the profit-maximizing (or
cost-minimizing) quantity of collateral to supply directly to the
market, q*. The area of the rectangle is the maximized repo divi-
dend, (r – R*)q*. If the trader’s total amount to be financed, Q,i s
greater than q*, then the difference, Q – q*, is financed via a
triparty repo. The amount supplied by others is S*.Conclusion
T
his article has presented the somewhat surpris-
ing proposition that an increase in expected
future short selling drives up the current price of a
Treasury bond because future repo dividends are
capitalized while the expected return on the security
is unchanged. The repo dividends arise when a bond
goes on special—that is, when the bond’s repo rate
falls below the risk-free rate. The liquidity premium
for an on-the-run Treasury security can be attributed
to this effect. 
The premium goes away when the bond goes
off the run because the holders of short positions
roll out of the current issue and into the new issue,
thereby eliminating the possibility of significant
future repo earnings. The on-the-run security’s pre-
dictable capital loss relative to other bonds is off-
set by its financing cost relative to other bonds.
Consequently, there are no profits to be made from
so-called convergence trades on average.
via term reverse repos. (For collateral acquired via
reverse repo, the term of the repo limits the dura-
tion of the repo squeeze; when the reverses mature,
the collateral must be returned.) One should recog-
nize that the “profits” from a repo squeeze come
from driving the repo spread up and earning a larger
repo dividend than otherwise. While it is true that a
repo squeeze drives the price of the security higher
than it otherwise would be, this feature is a side
effect. Since a squeeze can be maintained only by
one who controls the collateral, selling the security
is counterproductive.
Note that if the repo squeeze is fully anticipated,
the shorts bear no cost since they establish their
short positions at appropriately high prices. By the
same token, the trader earns no profits from a fully
anticipated squeeze since the prices at which he
acquired the security fully reflected his actions.
Thus, a repo squeeze is profitable only if it is not
fully anticipated.
40 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2002T
hus far, the discussion has considered only one-
period repo transactions, that is, those in which
the securities have been repoed (or reversed) for
one period only. However, term repo transactions
are quite common. In a term repo, a single, fixed
repo rate is agreed to at the inception of the trans-
action. Perhaps the best way to think about term
repo rates is as a way of quoting forward prices for
delivery more than one period in the future.
Consider an n-period bond that has a current
price of p. To establish a long forward position in
the bond for delivery in two periods, one buys the
bond and repos it in the term repo market for two
periods at the rate of R2 per period. The current
cash flow is zero. At time two, one pays (1 + R2)2p
and receives the bond. Thus, F2= (1 + R2)2p, where
F 2 is the forward price of a given bond for delivery
in two periods. In general, the forward price for
delivery in m periods is F m = (1 + Rm)mp, where Rm
is the m-period repo rate (per period) and F m is the
forward price for delivery in m periods.
Compare the cost of financing a bond for m
periods with a term repo versus rolling over one-
period financing. In the first case the cost is (1+




(1)). When there is no uncertainty, these two
costs must be the same, implying an expectations
hypothesis for repo rates: Rm ≈Σ
m–1
i=0 R(i)/m.
Consider again the price premium, ψ = log(p/p –).
For the baseline n-period bond, p – = 1/(1 + rn)n,
where rn is the yield to maturity of the baseline
bond (which earns no repo dividends). The price
premium can be reexpressed as
(A1.1)
where  sn =  rn –  Rn is the term repo spread.
Comparing the expression for ψ in equation






















s(i)/n, which shows that the term repo spread is
(approximately) the average of the one-period
repo spreads. Moreover, the term structure of
repo spreads can be used to forecast the dynam-
ics of the price premium. In particular, the n-period
change in the price premium is approximately
equal to (the negative of) the n-period term repo
spread, ψ(n) – ψ≈–sn, where ψ(n) is the price pre-
mium  n periods later. Uncertainty, of course,
complicates matters a bit: E[ψ(n)] – ψ≈–sn.
The chart displays the average pattern of three
term repo spreads over the course of a three-month
auction cycle. The term spreads are computed in
accordance with the expectations hypothesis from
the average pattern of overnight spreads shown in
Chart 10. These term repo spreads are in line with
those observed on the market.
APPENDIX 1
Term Structure of Repo Spreads
41 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2002































The Term Structure of Repo Spreads
Term repo spreads are computed from the stylized overnight
repo spreads in Chart 10: thirty-day (solid), sixty-day (dashed),
and ninety-day (dotted). When the security is issued at week 0,
the term structure slopes upward, anticipating the rise in
overnight rates; the thirty-day spread is about 39 basis points
while the ninety-day spread is about 100 basis points. By week
8, the term structure slopes steeply downward; the thirty-day
spread is about 160 basis points while the ninety-day spread
is about 56 basis points.T
he forward rate, F, can be used to forecast the
bond price next period, p′. A linear forecast
has the form ˆ p′ = α + βF, where ˆ p′ is the forecast.
The coefficients α and β are constants that can be
chosen to produce unbiased forecasts and to min-
imize the variance of the forecast error, p′– ˆ p′.
The slope coefficient, β, is computed as 
(A2.1)
where Cov[p′, F] is the covariance between p′
and F and Var[F] is the variance of F.1 If the
expectations hypothesis holds, then β = 1, in
which case ˆ p′ = α + F and changes in the fore-
cast (∆ˆ p′) correspond to changes in the forward
price (∆F).2 The forward risk premium plays a
central role in determining whether the expec-
tations hypothesis holds. It will be shown that if
π is constant (that is, if π is the same in every
period), then β = 1.
The strategy is to write both F and p′ in terms
of E[p′] by using the definition of the forward pre-
mium in equation (7) and the relation between
next period’s price and its current expectation in
equation (6). Substituting these expressions for
F and p′ into equation (A2.1) produces
(A2.2)
In the numerator of equation (A2.2), the properties
of covariances and the independence of ε imply3



































Finally, if π is constant, then equation (A2.3)
reduces to
A number of empirical studies have purported to
estimate β for U.S. data. These estimates typically
reject the hypothesis that β= 1 and conclude there-
fore that π is not constant. The following discussion
illustrates how these studies may have incorrectly
computed forward rates. Consequently, the slope
coefficient that was estimated involves additional
factors that were ignored.
Pseudo forward rates. The way of computing
forward prices that has been used in many empir-
ical studies is incorrect and can lead to spurious
rejections of the expectations hypothesis.
As before, let p denote the current price of an
n-period bond (where in this case n ≥ 2). Define
the pseudo forward price of the bond as ˜ F = p/p1,
where  p1 is the current price of a one-period
bond. The price of the one-period bond can be
written in terms of its own one-period repo rate:
p1 = 1/(1 + R1), where R1 is the one-period repo
rate for the one-period bond. Thus, the pseudo
forward price can be expressed as ˜ F = (1 + R1)p.
Comparing this expression for ˜ F with the expres-
sion for the true forward price, F = (1 + R)p,
shows that  ˜ F uses the wrong repo rate. The defi-
nition of the pseudo forward price implicitly
assumes one can finance the n-period bond at R1
rather than at its own repo rate R.
Defining the pseudo forward premium, π ˜ =
E[p′] –  ˜ F, note that π ˜ = (E[p′] – F) + (F –  ˜ F) = π +
(R – R1)p. In other words, the pseudo forward
premium equals the true forward premium plus
another term that reflects the difference between
the two repo rates. Even if the true forward pre-
mium were identically zero, the pseudo forward
premium would equal (R – R1)p.
Suppose the pseudo forward price (instead of
the true forward price) is used to forecast the
price of the bond next period. Let the linear fore-
cast be given by α ˜ + β ˜˜ F, where the coefficients α ˜
and β ˜ are chosen to minimize the forecast error.
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If π is constant but R1 – R is random, then β β ˜ ≠ 1.
Following the steps above that lead from equation
(A2.1) to equation (A2.3), but replacing F and π
with  ˜ F and π ˜, leads from equation (A2.3) to












By the properties of variance,4 equation (A2.5) can
be expressed as
(A2.6)
where A = Var[E[p′]] – Cov[E[p′], π ˜] and B =Var[π ˜]
– Cov[E[p′], π ˜]. If B = 0, then β ˜  = 1. If π is constant,
then π ˜ = (R – R1)p and B = Var[(R – R1)p] –






1. Conditionally (that is, given the information available at the beginning of the current period), F and E[p′] are known
constants. However, over time F and E[p′] vary from period to period. Therefore, unconditionally, they are random
variables with nonzero variances and covariances.
2. Strictly speaking, by itself β = 1 characterizes the weak form of the expectations hypothesis. The strong form also
requires α =0.
3. (i) Cov[a+b, c+d]=Cov[a,c]+Cov[a,d]+Cov[b,c]+Cov[b,d] and (ii) Cov[a,a]=V ar[a]. If a is independent of b, then
Cov[a,b]=0.
4. Var[a–b]=(Var[a] – Cov[a,b])+(Var[b] – Cov[a,b]).
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